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Abstract 
We present two schemata with which to parse cases of genocide and mass killings 
(GMK) for economic content. The first schema enumerates several ways in which 
economic aspects affect and are affected by episodes of GMK and roams across 
various economic concepts and theories that might be applied to case material. The 
second schema takes one specific economic theoretical framework, the theory of 
constrained optimization, and suggests how to employ it systematically to examine 
(1) perpetrators’, victims’, and third parties’ objectives, (2) the cost of perpetration, 
escape, or intervention, and (3) the resources available to pay (or fail to pay) these 
costs. In addition, since much of the GMK literature deals with cases following the 
1948 codification of the word genocide in international law, we illustrate the 
economic concepts and theories with pre-Holocaust examples. The intent of the 
chapter is to speak to both, economists and genocide scholars. (146 words) 
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The word genocide was coined in print in 1944 (Lemkin, 1944) and codified in 
international law in the UN Genocide Convention of 9 December 1948 (coming into 
force on 12 January 1951). The Convention defines genocide as “any of the following 
acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial, or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing 
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on 
the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in 
whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” 
 Samuel Totten and William Parsons (2013) point out in the very title of their 
book, Centuries of Genocide, that once the idea of a new concept is born, one 
recognizes that it may apply to eras preceding its invention and naming. Still, for 
various reasons much of the scholarly literature on genocide and other mass killings 
(GMK) concerns itself with post-world war two instances of GMK. Indeed, the book 
in which this chapter appears reflects this scholarly preference in that most of its 
cases and applications are of post-1948 vintage (e.g., Colombia, Indonesia, Rwanda, 
and Vietnam). In contrast, this chapter applies economic ideas to pre-Holocaust 
GMK cases, in fact to the five pre-Holocaust cases included in the Totten and 
Parsons book (4th edition, 2013). These are the cases of the Yana people in 
California, the Aborigines peoples of Australia, the Herero and Nama peoples in 
then-German South-West Africa, Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, and 
Ukrainians under Stalin. 
 The intent of this chapter is to apply to specific case material two nonspecific 
economic schemata recently proposed in the GMK literature. The first schema, by 
Anderton (2014), lays out six “key interdependencies” (p. 116) said to link economics 
and genocide. First, conflict, including genocidal conflict, typically is a deliberate 
choice made against feasible alternative choices that also could have been made. 
The study of the conditions under which choices are made, what are the 
consequences of such choices, and how choices may be “guided” by tweaking the 
conditions in laboratory or field experiments, are a staple of economics research. 
Second, prevailing economic conditions—such as poverty, low-growth economic 
performance, and property right disputes—can affect the risk, intensity, contagion, 
termination, and recurrence of genocidal conflict. Third, genocidal conflict, once 
started, affects the current performance of an economy, e.g., in diverting and 
destroying economic resources, in disrupting trade, in displacing people and 
disrupting the labor market, and in diminishing prospects for post-violence recovery 
and redevelopment of the economy. Fourth, genocidal conflict requires a “business 
model,” i.e., an organizational setup, whereby for example labor is recruited and 
trained, weapons and other deadly materials are acquired, a command and control 
system is built, and logistics and supply-chains are established. These topics fall 
within such sub-fields as managerial economics, business economics, and the 
economics of industrial organization. Fifth, genocidal conflict can be a mode of 
wealth appropriation. Examples include the accumulation of territories that contain 
valuable natural resources or the capture of capital goods and financial assets, and 
even of cultural goods (e.g., through artefact looting) and of victimized peoples 
themselves (e.g., for forced labor). Finally, sixth, genocidal violence deprives victims 
of the security of their property and person. But security, along with health and 
education, is a fundamental economic good without which sustained economic 
productivity and prosperity cannot be expected. 
 Section 2 of this chapter briefly puts each of these six “interdependencies” to a 
test with examples drawn from the pre-Holocaust cases narrated in Totten and 
Parsons (2013). The hope is twofold: first, that genocide scholars may perhaps more 
systematically perceive, recognize, and study the economic “field” and economic 
“techniques” of genocide that Raphael Lemkin (1944) himself already spelled out 
and, second, that economists and economic historians may feel encouraged to delve 
more deeply into specific pre-Holocaust cases and to elaborate on them through an 
economic lens. (Lemkin’s eight “fields” of genocide are the political, social, cultural, 
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economic, biological, physical, religious, and moral fields.) 
 The second schema, by Brauer and Anderton (2014), takes one economic 
theory—constrained optimization theory (COT)—and illustratively applies it in 
Section 3 to pre-Holocaust examples. This is an elaboration of Anderton’s (2014) 
first interdependency—genocide as a deliberate choice made as against feasible non-
genocidal alternatives. The general idea is that perpetrators, victims, and third 
parties (internal and external bystanders) each have specific objectives 
(respectively, to victimize, to escape victimization, and whether to intervene or not) 
and that the feasible alternatives from which each chooses one specific course of 
action are constrained by a limited pool of resources available to pay the cost of the 
action (victimization, escape, or intervention). For perpetrators, victims, and third 
parties, respectively, Tables A1A, A1B, and A1C in the Appendix are abstracted 
from Brauer and Anderton (2014). They lay out in some detail who forms 
preferences (objectives) over genocide (or escape or intervention), what these 
preferences entail, and why, when, where, and how they are formed. The tables also 
lay out detailed, but not case-specific, ideas in regard to the monetary and 
nonmonetary resources available to pay the monetary and nonmonetary costs of 
perpetrating, escaping, or intervening in genocide. They also make points in regard 
to factors that may enhance the productivity of conducting, escaping, or intervening 
in genocide. 
 
TABLES A1A, A1B, A1C ABOUT HERE 
  
Again, the hope is twofold. We hope that genocide scholars will appreciate the 
illustrative re-reading of pre-Holocaust cases in light of the idea that specific 
genocidal choices made are the direct outcome of resource and cost constraints and 
that, had the constraints been less binding (for perpetrators, victims, or potential 
interveners), a non-genocidal choice may well have been made. Re-reading genocide 
history through the lens of optimization given monetary and nonmonetary resource 
and cost constraints may help to more deeply or, at any rate, differently understand 
GMK cases. Likewise, for economists, the illustrative applications of COT in this 
chapter may encourage them to more deeply delve into particular aspects of 
genocide decisionmaking, not just in post-Holocaust cases as the literature already 
does but also in pre-Holocaust cases and thus deepen the theoretical and empirical 
basis of applying (one) economic theory to a larger set of cases of GMK. Section 4 
concludes the chapter. 
 
2. KEY INTERDEPENDENCIES 
Genocidal conflict as a deliberate choice. Genocide rarely appears as a fully formed 
choice. Typically, it is preceded by a number of signposts. In a famous briefing paper 
prepared for U.S. government officials, Gregory Stanton (1996) writes of eight 
stages of genocide: “The first stages precede later stages, but continue to operate 
throughout the genocidal process. Each stage reinforces the others. A strategy to 
prevent genocide should attack each stage, each process. The eight stages of 
genocide are classification, symbolization, [discrimination], dehumanization, 
organization, polarization, preparation, [persecution], extermination, and denial.” 
(The items in square brackets—discrimination and persecution—were added in a 
later rendition to become “The 10 Stages of Genocide.”) But, in time, the choice of 
genocide is made. For each of the cases of the Yana, Aborigines, Herero and Nama, 
Armenians, and Ukrainians, the literature summarized in the Totten and Parsons 
(2013) case collection leaves no doubt about genocide eventually having been chosen 
by perpetrators as a deliberate objective as against feasible, non-genocidal 
alternatives of dealing with unwanted out-groups. 
 For example, the Yana were a population of some 3,000 Native Americans, living 
at the northern end of California’s Central Valley. Their eventual extermination 
was perfect in the sense that at the beginning of the twentieth century only one 
Yana survivor was reported to be alive and the group’s reproduction therefore no 
longer possible (also see, e.g., Kugler, ch. 11, and von Joeden-Forgey, ch. 12, in this 
6 
 
volume). According to the case author, Ben Madley, in the wake of the Californian 
gold rush from the late 1840s to the 1880s, the “motives driving immigrants to 
destroy the Yana changed over time, as did the organization of their killing 
operations” (p. 18). In the end, however, the initial colonizers as well as later 
immigrants wanted to establish an “Indian-free environment” (p. 24) to appropriate 
land-based natural resources for “ranching, hunting, and mining” (p. 22). On 
occasion, their purpose might have appeared to be defensive and retaliatory because 
of Indian raids against settlers but, in time, the goal became Yana elimination for 
its own sake. This was government tolerated and government co-financed. For 
instance, in support of the state’s first civilian governor, Peter H. Burnett, who 
declared that “a war of extermination will continue to be waged … until the Indian 
race becomes extinct” (p. 20)—and one can hardly be clearer about the 
deliberateness of the intent and the genocidal choice made—California’s legislators 
appropriated US$500,000 and US$600,000 dollars in 1851 and 1852, respectively, to 
fund state-sanctioned Indian-hunting campaigns staffed by militia volunteers. This 
gained momentum in 1858-1859 when colonizers bent on institutionalized killings 
received support from then-Governor John B. Weller. Again, a state-supported 
militia, led by Adjutant General William C. Kibbe, was created. Money was raised 
to hire men literally to hunt Indians. Kibbe claimed the sum of US$69,486 for the 
expedition. Indian-hunters were compensated with an amount of cash paid per 
Indian scalp. The incentive structure proved important and personal greed partly 
motivated and reinforced the campaign against the Yana. “Ultimately,” writes 
Madley, “the drive to destroy the Yana became an ideology of total annihilation” (p. 
44). The choice no longer was merely to confiscate Indian-held resources or to 
enslave Indians as laborers. The choice made was to kill to the point of group 
extermination. Section 3 elaborates on the cost and resource constraints that 
shaped this, and other genocide, choices. That genocide becomes a choice is no 
longer in dispute among genocide scholars. But the conditions that help shape the 
making of this choice are perhaps less-well clearly examined and understood. 
Section 3 addresses this issue in more detail as do a number of more technical and 
formal chapters in this book, including Anderton and Brauer (2015). 
 Economic conditions affecting genocidal conflict. Between 1904 and 1907 
imperial Germany waged a war against the Herero population that had revolted 
against colonial rule in German South-West Africa (now Namibia). The chapter 
author in Totten and Parsons (2013), Dominik Schaller, writes that initially aimed 
solely against Herero, the war eventually embroiled Nama people as well. The 
latter, after at first supporting the settlers, began guerrilla operations against the 
German army because of a growing fear that commander’s Lothar von Trotta’s 
racist and explicit extermination policy would be applied to Nama as well as to 
Herero (p. 90). By the end of the war about 60,000 Herero and 10,000 Nama had 
died (p. 90). Long before the German-Herero war and subsequent genocide 
commenced, colonists had been “waiting for the elimination of the Africans as 
autonomous actors [ but] were well aware that their military power and colonial 
infrastructure had not been sufficient. Therefore, settlers were afraid that a major 
African uprising could hamper the positive political and economic development in 
the colony” (pp. 90-91). Uprisings did happen, with the one on 12 January 1904 
generally cited as the beginning of war between Herero and the about 5,000 
Germans, English, and Boer colonists (p. 94). 
 At the turn of the century, Herero numbered about 80,000 people in Central 
Namibia. Traditionally pastoralists, by the mid-1800s they had become the region’s 
predominant cattle herders, breeders, and traders. The Nama, numbering about 
20,000, lived mostly in South Namibia. Also a cattle-people, they traded mostly with 
the Cape Colony further to the south. Northern Namibia, not much accessed by 
Europeans, was inhabited by about 450,000 Ovambo people who lived on fishing, 
agriculture, and trade with Ovambo’s to the north, in Portuguese Angola. Schaller 
describes the indigenous societies as “strong and independent and ... not at all ready 
to give up their self-sustaining economies” (p. 93). However, a cattle disease 
(Rinderpest) arrived in 1897 and resulted in a 90 percent loss of cattle. While the 
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settlers managed to inoculate their own herds, for the indigenous people loss of 
cattle meant loss of nutrition. Subsequent enfeeblement then made them vulnerable 
to malaria, of which about 10,000 Herero died. Bereft of labor and cattle, many 
survivors found themselves forced to sell their labor services to the settlers. 
Economically weakened tribal chiefs sold large swaths of tribal land to the settlers, 
in addition to huge land holdings they had previously sold in exchange for 
recognition as tribal leaders by settler governments (especially Germany). 
 Overall, the sudden cattle deprivation shifted the economic balance between 
colonizers and natives dramatically. The purpose of the Herero revolt was to 
forestall full economic expropriation (dispossession of all land and property). Once 
German policy became an extermination policy in a later phase of the war, natives’ 
objectives shifted to pure physical survival. Economic geography made things worse 
in that Herero could flee only into “the waterless Omaheke desert where they had to 
face death from starvation and exhaustion ... The paths through the desert to 
British Bechuanaland were known to the Herero as traditional trade routes [but] 
the capacity of the water holes was not sufficient to ensure the survival of all the 
refugees” (pp. 90-91). Clearly, economic conditions affect the onset, course, and 
termination of genocide. 
 Genocidal conflict affects the economy. If economic conditions affect the origin 
and conduct of genocide, the converse holds as well: Genocide affects the economy. 
The genocide of Australia’s indigenous people—Aborigines and Torres Strait 
Islanders—took place approximately between the late 1700s and the 1980s, an 
unusually extensive period of about 200 years. Australia’s federal government did 
not formally apologize until the year 2008. Aborigines are not a single people but an 
artificial identifier covering individuals of many clans. (On identify and economics, 
see Akerlof and Kranton, 2011.) In terms of the UN Genocide Convention, it is 
undisputed that an attempt was made to eliminate Aborigines as distinct peoples: 
Many were killed outright; serious physical and mental harm was inflicted with 
deliberation; conditions of life were calculated to destroy its members; children of 
pure and mixed Aborigines descent were forcibly transferred; and measures were 
taken to prevent births within the groups. In addition, writes chapter author Colin 
Tatz in Totten and Parsons (2013), there was conspiracy, incitement, attempt, and 
complicity to commit genocide, all orchestrated as a matter of government policy. In 
all, by 1911 Aborigines populations had declined from 500,000 or more individuals 
in 1788 to a low of between 30,000 to 80,000 people. (According to the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, the populations recovered to 670,000 by mid-2011.) 
 In the initial phrase of the genocide—the first one hundred years or so—its effect 
on the developing economy of the various Australian colonies was to clear land for 
settlement. (Australia’s six colonies federated into an independent nation-state only 
on 1 January 1901.) At the time of settlement, in the 1700s, “[t]he land was treated 
as a wasteland but for flora and fauna, of which the ‘natives’ were deemed a part” 
(p. 56). Land was regarded as terra nullius—belonging to no one and therefore free 
for the taking, a doctrine not overturned until a High Court decision in 1992 
recognized Aboriginal title to traditional land ownership. Policy with regard to 
“natives” was colony- or state-based until 1967 when a nationwide referendum 
resulted in the transfer of relevant powers to the federal government. 
 The effect of the genocide on Aborigines communities was the opposite to that on 
the settlers’ economy. As settlers expanded north and south of Botany Bay (today’s 
Sydney) and inland to Central and then Western Australia, Aborigines were herded 
into remote reservations, cattle stations, and church missions, most “splendidly 
secluded,” “foolishly selected,” “almost inaccessible domains [that] were not 
Aboriginal choices or places of their natural habitat” (p. 64). “Quintessentially 
nomadic hunter-gatherers became sedentary and stationary” (p. 64). Without title 
to land, nor any other legal protection, their numbers and economy collapsed. 
Where “actual remuneration [for work] was paid, these monies went into state-run 
trust funds, much of which disappeared” (p. 64). Nor could Aborigines workers “join 
essentially racist trade unions” (p. 64). The examples can be multiplied and, as in 
the Yana and South-West African cases, show an unambiguous bifurcated effect 
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favoring the settlers’ economy while decimating that of the indigenous peoples. 
 The “business model” of genocide. Between 1915 and 1923, in the final phase of 
the dissolution of the Ottoman empire, its Armenian population suffered a genocide. 
According to chapter author Rouben Adalian in Totten and Parsons (2013), the 
number of victims is estimated at 1.5 million people. The Armenian minority in 
Turkey constituted an anomaly: Over the span of more than 14 centuries it never 
assimilated and consistently kept its Christian identity and culture. Throughout the 
late 1800s, Armenians already had been the target of episodic massacres from 
military and paramilitary forces. By 1915, the Ottoman economy had experienced a 
steady decline of its powers and economy. Average GDP per capita was less than 
one-third of the European average and the economy mostly at subsistence levels in 
rural areas. The empire, buffeted by Russian, Austro-Hungarian, British, and other 
interests, did not succeed to keep pace and modernize. Its imperial wings were 
clipped as its soldiers lost numerous battles and territories in Southeastern Europe, 
Western Asia, and North Africa. The resulting internal turmoil led Ottoman 
authorities under the initially somewhat liberal and tolerant Committee of Union 
and Progress (CUP) to withdraw into Turkish nationalism, militarization, 
Islamification, centralization, and consolidation of power, at the expense of non-
Muslim and non-Turkish populations. 
 Seeking to effect a far-reaching elimination of minorities, guarantee itself full 
control of territory, and to confiscate Armenian properties, the state built up a 
secret police of 40,000 people. Details are provided in Section 3 but, in brief, many 
agencies and ministries of the Ottoman state were involved in the implementation 
of the genocide. A secret agency (the “Special Organization”), committed to mass 
murder, was created. The extermination plan involved, in large part, forced 
deportations to Syria and Mesopotamia which, by design, then reduced to a simple 
process: Escorted columns of deportees, mostly women, children, the elderly, and 
infirm, were decimated through robbery, exposure, privation, starvation, or direct 
attack, on their way to, or in, the Syrian desert. Illustration 4 in Section 3 will 
expand on this, especially in regard to how the availability of Ottoman resources 
helped shape the specific form that the genocide took. 
 Genocide as wealth appropriation. Stalin’s manufactured famine in east-central 
Ukraine and the North Caucasus in 1932/3 resulted in perhaps 5 to 7 million 
victims. At the time, the Great Depression badly affected the economies of the 
entire world. James Mace, author of the Ukraine chapter in Totten and Parsons 
(2013), writes that the USSR “seized with unprecedented force and thoroughness 
the 1932 crop and food-stuffs from the agricultural population” (p. 157). Ukrainian 
farms were forcibly collectivized, food production first requisitioned, then simply 
confiscated and siphoned off. But wealth appropriation goes beyond Lemkin’s 
narrowly-understood economic “field,” such as “including forced impoverishment, 
expelling people from businesses and occupations, manipulations of trade and 
finance, appropriation of assets and enslavement” (Anderton, 2014, p. 125). Wealth 
appropriation in a broader sense refers to the taking of any and all resources at the 
victims’ disposal, economic or otherwise, and thus covers all of Lemkin’s eight 
domains over which genocide is carried out (the political, social, cultural, [narrowly] 
economic, biological, physical, religious, and moral fields). For example, Ukrainian 
victims, mostly a peasantry, had an “incomplete social structure, [lacked their] own 
ruling class,” and had no independent political clout (p. 158). As for others in 
imperial Russia, Ukrainians social and cultural assets already had been severely 
challenged (p. 158). With the collapse of the empire, in 1917, Russia’s new leaders 
sought to unify the country under the ideological banner of a progressive urban 
proletariat to be set against rural, traditionalist interests. A new consciousness was 
to be established, neither Russian nor Ukrainian, but based on a self-understanding 
as an international proletariat united against exploitative capitalists. The rural and 
urban proletariat of the various nations of the USSR were to unite against land-
owning rentiers. In a way, all peoples, and the wealth inherent in their ethnic, 
linguistic, cultural, and other forms of diversity, were to be appropriated and 
abolished as separately recognizable entities and cultures. They were to be reborn 
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as a new nation of proletarian workers and peasants. 
 This notion of “national nihilism” (p. 161) was based, in part, on Rosa 
Luxemburg’s writings (p. 161) and on Joseph Stalin’s own article on “Marxism and 
the National Question,” penned in 1912-1913, in which he had criticized the idea of 
permitting any cultural-national autonomy to persist. But under Lenin’s initial 
leadership of the USSR, following the October Revolution of 1917, a pragmatic 
course was chosen in that non-Russian nations and their local, rural mores were 
recognized and accommodated. Lenin’s New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1921 thus 
permitted for example rural, private markets to persist, one avenue by which to 
help integrate diverse populations into the new Soviet workers’ and peasants’ state 
(p. 159). In 1923, in part to deal with “continued national resistance” to integration, 
Lenin fostered “indignization, which attempted to give non-Russian Soviet regimes 
a veneer of national legitimacy by promoting the spread of the local language and 
culture in the cities, recruiting local people into the regime, ordering Russian 
officials to learn the local language, and fostering a broad range of cultural 
activities” (p. 159; also see p. 161). Following Lenin’s death in 1924 and the 
subsequent power struggle, however, Stalin replaced Lenin’s NEP in 1927 with a 
program of forced collectivization of agriculture and pursued a push toward urban-
based industrialization (the Revolution from Above). This required an increasingly 
simplified ideology wherein a stubborn petty bourgeois class of landowners (the 
kulaks) was said to exploit other types of farm-workers and accused of withholding 
food supplies from the remainder of the USSR, and combined with Stalin’s 
definition of a nation: “A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of 
people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and 
psychological make-up manifested in a common culture ... It must be emphasized 
that none of the above characteristics taken separately is sufficient to define a 
nation. More than that, it is sufficient for a single one of these characteristics to be 
lacking and the nation ceases to be a nation.”1 This definition proved to be the basis 
for eliminating non-Russian national identities. Wealth appropriation in this broad 
sense—as the total appropriation of any and all resources that give rise to 
sustainable cultures, economies, and polities—is astonishingly far-reaching. 
Appropriation also is an eminently economic topic. 
 Genocide as deprivation of security as a fundamental service. Alongside health 
and education, the physical security of one’s property, person, family, and 
community is fundamental to a well-ordered society. Depriving a people of the 
protection of the law and giving immunity to perpetrators—or even to incentivize 
them—creates insecurity. For example, under Stalin an internal passport system 
was introduced that limited people’s freedom of movement. Escape routes were 
blocked. In Australia, permission for leave government created Aborigines reserves 
needed to be sought from the colonial authorities, usually to work on cattle stations 
but without any labor rights, not even to the legal minimum wage. Legally defined 
as “under legal guardianship, wards of the state, minors in law, specifically denied 
civil rights, social welfare entitlements, and most of the benefits inherent and 
explicit in the rule of law” (p. 64), Aborigines neither could marry nor legally engage 
in sexual intercourse with non-Aborigines. Nor could they vote in state or federal 
elections until the 1960s. The point was seclusion, privation, and—with the removal 
of their children—genocide (pp. 64-65). The Yana, in California, had no protection of 
their property or their lives under the law and the literal hunting of Yana was 
financially incentivized by the governments of California and the federal 
government of the United States. The Herero and Nama, in South-West Africa, 
“were dispossessed and all their land was officially seized by the colonial power … 
All Africans were compelled to compulsory work” and colonial decrees “restricted 
the Africans’ freedom of movement gravely and forced them to carry a tiny identity 
badge around the neck” (p. 96). In Ottoman Turkey, the state was “withholding 
from [Armenians] the protection of the state” (p. 119). The examples can be 
                                                 




multiplied at will. Under conditions of pervasive insecurity, a part of the work force 
is converted from an economic asset to an economic liability as their productivity 
and economic contribution to the country is reduced. This necessarily is a topic for 
economics and economists. 
 In sum, even a cursory reading of the pre-Holocaust literature easily yields 
ample illustrations for each of Anderton’s (2014) claimed “interdependencies” 
between economics and genocide. His contention that economic considerations may 
offer valuable additional insights into the process of genocide seems quite on the 
mark and may well be worth pursuing in greater detail in separate research efforts. 
 
3. CONSTRAINED OPTIMIZATION THEORY 
An example of a formal (i.e., mathematics-based) application of constrained 
optimization theory (COT) to cases of genocide and mass killings (GMK) is provided 
in Anderton and Brauer (2015). The theory makes specific predictions and raises 
specific policy issues for would-be interveners to consider. A nonformal statement of 
COT is developed in Brauer and Anderton (2014) for which this section in this 
chapter provides several case illustrations drawn from the pre-Holocaust era. In 
short, the hardly disputable idea is that to achieve a desired end, even that of 
genocide, perpetrators necessarily must avail themselves of resources to pay the 
cost of achieving their objective. Genocide requires a set of actions and these actions 
incur costs to be defrayed from a pool of resources. Logically, there are two 
dimensions to thinking about genocide in terms of COT: If the general objective is 
simply the removal of an undesired out-group, then their killing as a specific act is 
but one among a number of alternative options to achieve the general objective. For 
example, the relocation of the out-group to territories of other states is, in principle, 
an alternative option. But even if killing itself is the objective, it would still be true 
that different forms of killing (shooting, gassing, starving, and so on) impose 
different draws on the perpetrators’ resource base. In either case, it is a safe 
presumption that perpetrators are not as wasteful with their resources as they are 
with their intended victims’ lives. The theory thus predicts that as cost and resource 
constraints—or changes in cost and resource constraints—become binding, they 
seemingly force the hand of perpetrators as if to direct them, given a specific 
objective they wish to achieve, into one form of genocide rather than another. 
Perpetrators are hypothesized to attempt to “optimize” the destruction, subject to 
cost and resource constraints. (Of course, the objective itself can change as well.) 
 COT does not justify perpetrators’ objectives. The point is not to understand the 
beliefs upon which perpetrators act. Instead, the intent is to understand the 
calculus of the act itself and of how (changes in) cost and resource constraints 
influence the act about to be undertaken. Note that COT reasoning also applies to 
victims who attempt to escape victimization as well as to potential third-party 
interveners since they, too, act under cost and resource constraints. One conclusion 
from the COT perspective is that genocide, and mass killings more generally, may 
be viewed, analytically, as a life-or-death contest over costs and the resources to 
defray them. If the cost is too high or the resource base too small, perpetrators may 
remain hateful but have no means to act on their beliefs, however come by. 
Likewise, if the cost is too high or the resource base too small, victims cannot hope 
to escape victimization and third parties cannot intervene, whatever else they may 
feel, think, or say, in private or in public. Also note that costs and resources include 
nonmonetary costs and resources and include the entire panoply of feelings, 
perceptions, images, and attitudes on the basis of which humans form, maintain, or 
change the objectives they wish to pursue (see Illustration 2 below; also see 
Boulding, 1956; Stigler and Becker, 1977). 
 A total of 45 possible combinations can be considered: Five pre-Holocaust cases 
times three parties, namely, perpetrators (P), victims (V), and third parties (T), 
times three analytical items, preferences or objectives (O), costs (C) and resources 
(R). For example, for the Yana case alone, one could examine the combinations OP, 
OV, OT, CP, CV, CT, and RP, RV, and RT. The combinations are multiplied when 
considering how each combination may affect the productivity of each party or when 
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considering interactions, feedback effects, and path dependencies among 
preferences, costs, and resources. For reasons of space limitations, only five 
combinations are chosen in the following illustrations but hints at 
interdependencies are provided. 
 Illustration 1 (Yana): Ben Madley, in his chapter on the Yana in Totten and 
Parsons (2013), succinctly summarizes the victims’ alternatives: “To protect 
themselves Yana people had three choices. They could seek protection from the 
newcomers (by becoming servants, concubines, wives, and laborers), fight them, or 
retreat into the mountains. All three options were hazardous” (pp. 19-20). Since 
Native Americans had virtually no rights under California law, living among 
colonizers and immigrants could be (and was) capricious. Not having legal recourse 
translates into not having the resource of law and its enforcement. Moreover, 
individual-by-individual “integration” would, in any case, dilute the group as a 
recognizable, separate entity with which individuals born to the group could 
identify. Regarding the second option, to hope to engage, fight, and win against the 
settlers’ superior numbers and firepower with the bows and arrows at the Yana’s 
disposal implied an implausibly high death-toll cost. The remaining option was 
withdrawal into the surrounding mountains, by no means a pleasant choice, but a 
choice nonetheless—in fact, a constrained choice in that the alternatives were even 
worse, precisely in the optimization meaning of COT, to “make the best of a 
situation, given the circumstances.” Had they then been left alone, the Yana might 
have adapted but “immigrants made mountain life increasingly difficult” (p. 20). 
Ranching, hunting, and mining (by despoiling rivers and the salmon fish stock upon 
which Yana relied) depleted the resource base by which to survive. Instead of open 
fighting, Yana resorted to raids, robbery, and arson of settlers’ homesteads (p. 26). 
In an action-reaction pattern, or so Madley describes the sequence of events, 
settlers responded in kind, raiding Indian camps in turn. Their numbers, firepower, 
recourse to state financing (and, later, to federal financing, p. 32), as well as 
immunity from the law for abusing or killing Indians, overwhelmed the Yana. 
During one of General Kibbe’s Indian-hunting campaigns, he endeavored to keep 
Yana on the run, hemmed them in certain locations to deny them opportunity and 
time “to gather acorns or seeds sufficient for winter, or to fish.” He thus prepared 
them for death by starvation lest they surrendered to accept forced relocation onto 
reservations, “an agonizing choice” (p. 31)—again precisely the point COT makes. 
True, fleeing ever further from familiar hunting, harvesting, and fishing grounds 
and abandoning camps and food stores did imply that the Yana had increasingly 
“little to lose” (p. 35), but they also had even less to fight with to effectively oppose 
their own destruction. Madley rightly points out that “the state of California, the 
U.S. government, or immigrant communities could have negotiated with the Yana 
and avoided genocide” and that “diplomacy might have generated a very different 
outcome” (p. 45). But by then both the mind set and the incentive structure (e.g., 
cash for scalps and legal immunity) made that unlikely, especially since a good part 
of the final phase of the Californian annihilation campaigns (1860-1872) occurred 
while the East and South of the country were embroiled in the U.S. civil war (1861-
1865) and its aftermath. The case well illustrates how victims’ resources constrain 
the set of feasible alternatives left to them. 
 Illustration 2 (Aborigines): If the Yana illustration focuses on the interplay of 
cost and resource constraints for the victims, the Aborigines illustration centers on 
third party preferences—albeit it with a twist. While in the genocide’s first phase, 
many individuals in Australia felt uninhibited to abuse Aborigines at will, for 
others this did cause misgivings and a movement to protect victims arose such that 
“the colony of Queensland was pressed to introduce the world’s first statute to 
protect a people from genocide: The Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the 
Sale of Opium Act of 1897” (p. 58). With it came state-concerted efforts at 
segregation into mission schools, welfare institutions, land reserves, and 
institutionalized child removals. Given Victorian-era mores, this may have been 
well-intended. A third party—the colonies’ educated, “good-hearted” members of 
society of prominence and rank, especially in government and church—gradually 
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asserted more political power over dealing with Australia’s Aborigines populations. 
A preference change took place but, according to Colin Tatz’ description in Totten 
and Parsons (2013), this did not change the fact that the (perhaps unwitting) 
objective remained genocide. What resulted was the conversion of seemingly 
random, more or less spontaneous acts of disorderly genocide into an ordered, i.e., 
institutionalized, genocide. Aborigines peoples and cultures still were to be 
eliminated as distinct, identifiable entities. One group of perpetrators replaced 
another. 
 For instance, “key state bureaucrats” held a national summit in Canberra in 
1937. One of its leaders proposed a three-part plan: “full blood” Aborigines were to 
be segregated into reserves; mixed children removed from their mothers; and 
marriage control be orchestrated such that “quarter- and half-blood Aboriginal 
maidens would marry into the white community. It would then be possible to 
‘eventually forget that there were ever any Aborigines in Australia’” (p. 62). In 
another example, until 1939, in the state of New South Wales (which includes the 
city of Sydney) the stated, official reason for child removal from Aborigines 
parents—handwritten into the record books—frequently read “For being 
Aboriginal” (p. 63). (Thereafter, at least a removal hearing before a magistrate was 
required.) While lives were saved (people not killed), ironically child removal 
“destroyed much of the fabric of Aboriginal societies” (p. 65). The “protection-
segregation era” (p. 55), which lasted into the 1980s, thus raises the point that the 
UN Genocide Convention’s “intent to destroy” need not be restricted to bad faith or 
intent (male fides). Even well-meaning—“good”—intent can lead to genocide and is 
a punishable offense. The prevalence of a male fides interpretation of the 
Convention perhaps explains why child removals in particular continued on a grand 
scale even after Australia ratified, in 1949, the UN Genocide Convention. 
 There is an interesting interaction that emerges here between perpetrators’ 
mind set and nonmonetary costs and resources. Once perpetrators’ mental, 
perceptual constraint changed in the 1970s and 1980s, once their image of 
themselves and of their victims changed, genocidal actions directed against 
Aborigines peoples ceased rapidly. In the South African context, Kleinschmidt 
(1972) refers to this as the need for “white liberation” from their own mind set. Akin 
to Johan Galtung’s concepts of positive peace and negative peace, this might be 
viewed as a “positive liberation” instead of a “negative liberation,” the latter 
restraining acts of genocide but leaving the intent unchanged, the former changing 
the intent of the perpetrators. The point refers the cost of preference formation and, 
more specifically, the cost of changing habitual, or habituated, lines of thought and 
leads to a discussion, can pursued here, of the role of upbringing, 
neurodevelopment, peer effects, socialization, education, and conformity versus 
resistance. 
 Illustration 3 (Herero and Nama): In Section 2, the story of how economic 
conditions affect genocide was told mainly from the Herero and Nama point of view. 
The story is continued here from the settlers’ point of view and as an illustration of 
how binding cost and resource constraints affect the initiation and conduct of 
genocide. Namibia’s climate was harsh, transportation and communication of the 
day (both to as well as within Namibia) were poor, dispersed, and difficult, and 
while Chancellor Bismarck’s government in Berlin did want colonies, it was not 
keen to spend great sums on them. Prior to 1904, a divide-and-rule policy that 
played tribal leaders in Namibia against each other permitted the acquisition of 
vast tracts of land even as the number of settlers was small, only about 4 percent of 
the Central and South Namibian populations. When war broke out, Herero at first 
prevailed. It took nearly half a year for imperial Germany to send 14,000 troops and 
start its annihilationist campaign under von Trotta’s command. As a military man, 
he sought a military sort of victory. “The Hereros are no longer German subjects,” 
he wrote, and continued that “all the Hereros must leave the land. If the people do 
not do this, then I will force them to do it with the great guns. Any Herero found 
within the German borders with or without a gun, with or without cattle, will be 
shot” (quoted from p. 89 of Schaller’s account in Totten and Parsons, 2013). But the 
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campaign was not cheap. In monetary terms, the apparently vast sum of 585 million 
Reichsmark was spent on troops, weapons, and logistics, and almost 2,000 of von 
Trotta’s troops died from epidemics (p. 90). Because of this monetary and manpower 
cost constraint, von Trotta changed tactics, forcing people to flee into the desert and 
perish there. Yet the settlers were not in favor of von Trotta’s policy of killing. What 
concerned them, instead, was their quest for forced labor so as to lower their labor 
costs and to improve the fortunes of the settler economy. Both private and public 
German employers increasingly relied on forced labor to address a labor supply 
shortage. Consequently, settlers contested von Trotta’s extermination order and 
lobbied the Kaiser’s government in Berlin to order the establishment of 
concentration camps to corral the forced laborers. These were in fact ordered by 
then-Chancellor von Bülow and built in the second phase of the war. Conditions 
were harsh, with a death rate of 44 percent between 1905 and 1907, as the German 
army command itself reported (percentage calculated from figures given on p. 95). 
In arguing why von Trotta’s killing policy needed to stop, the German commissioner 
of settler affairs in South-West Africa, Paul Rohrback, commented in his 1953 
biography that “South-West Africa with natives was of much more value ... than 
without” (p. 90). Cost and resource considerations (constraints) influenced the 
conduct of the genocide. 
 In a third phase, following the war itself, captives were released into a political, 
economic, and cultural vacuum. The colonial authorities instituted a policy of tribal 
de-identification and proletarian re-identification was pursued, a cultural genocide 
and repurposing of human beings for economic exploitation. In a 1907 decree, 
freedom of movement was severely restricted for indigenous peoples and the 
wearing of identity tags made mandatory. Additionally, settlers demanded that all 
indigenous peoples be tattooed (p. 96). Still fearing uprisings, a deportation policy 
was considered to ship victims to the then-German colonies of Cameroon and Papua 
New Guinea but the outbreak of world war one prevented its large-scale 
implementation (p. 96). 
 Illustration 4 (Armenians): The fourth illustration focuses on the resources a 
perpetrator can bring to bear on the victims. As mentioned, the Ottoman empire 
“withdrew the protection of the state” from Armenian subjects: Its cabinet made the 
decisions, charged its Ministries of the Interior and of War with overseeing the 
destruction, and they in turn “instructed local authorities on procedure, the timing 
of deportation, and the routing of the convoys of exiles” (p. 126). Parliament 
“enacted legislation legalizing the decisions of the cabinet” (p. 126). The Turkish 
leaders had “at their disposal immense resources of power and an arsenal of formal 
and informal instruments of coercion” (p. 118). And “at every level of the operation 
against the Armenians, party [i.e., CUP] functionaries relayed, received, and 
enforced the orders of the government” (p. 119). The primary prong of attack 
consisted of deportation orders, implemented by removal by train, or by horse-
drawn wagon, by mules, or—for most victims—by walking southeast from the 
Anatolian plain or either south from the Black Sea or southwest from Armenia, 
both mountainous regions, toward the Syrian desert. The government made “no 
provisions” to supply food or overnight shelter and “only one-quarter of all deportees 
survived the hundreds of miles and weeks of walking” (p. 120). Local governments 
assisted in the deliberate neglect. Marauders, including Kurds (another, but 
Muslim, minority), preyed on refugee caravans, looting, raping, kidnapping, and 
killing without penalty. Those who survived all the way to Syria died there from the 
day’s heat or night’s cold or were assaulted by “sword and bayonet” by the Special 
Organization’s killing units (p. 120). Rouben Adalian, the author of the Armenia 
chapter in Totten and Parsons (2013), writes that the “deportations were not 
intended to be an orderly relocation process” (p. 120). Our alternative reading says 
that the genocide was in fact highly orderly in that government provided for the 
underlying structure which was “conceived with secrecy and deliberation and 
implemented with organization and efficiency” (p. 119). For example, joining 
Germany late in 1914 as a world war one axis power, Turkey hoped to regain 
territories it had lost in the Russo-Turkish war in the late 1870s. Fearing Armenian 
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collaboration with (co-religionist) Russians, or so Enver Pasha, the Minister of War 
argued, able-bodied Armenian men were “conscripted into the Turkish armies, 
[then] disarmed, forced into labor battalions [for logistics support], and either 
worked to death or outright murdered” (pp. 120-121). Older males “were summoned 
by the government and ordered to prepare themselves for removal from their places 
of habitation” (p. 121). They submitted unwittingly, apparently not expecting 
subsequent imprisonment, torture, and mass executions. To undermine resistance, 
“prominent leaders were specially selected for swift excision from their 
communities” (p. 121), about 250 of them in an especially coordinated action in 
Constantinople on the night of 23 to 24 April 1915, now often taken as the nominal 
date of the beginning of the genocide against Armenians. Women, children, the 
elderly, and the infirm went on the death marches to Syria, herded along by soldiers 
(p. 126). Extermination camps were built on today’s borders with Iraq and Syria. 
The killings in Syria were carried out by killing units. But resources were not 
infinite. For example, bullets were spared for the war effort by forming a Special 
Organization of convicted criminals to kill with “scimitars and daggers” (p. 127). 
Armenians’ “abandoned goods” were confiscated and auctioned off, profiting CUP 
officials and as a “means that rewarded its supporters” (p. 127). Still, set against 
the resources of the Ottoman state as a whole, neither Armenians themselves nor 
third parties—embroiled as they were in world war one—could or did offer any 
effective counter-force. 
 Illustration 5 (Ukraine): This illustration highlights a few aspects of the 
impossibly high cost to victims of escaping Stalin’s program of forced starvation. 
Since James Mace’s chapter in Totten and Parsons (2013) is written primarily from 
the point of view of perpetrators’ actions, relatively little is said that directly 
pertains to the monetary or nonmonetary costs victims’ faced to resist or to escape. 
(Little is mentioned of their resources, either, but both faults are rectified to some 
degree in the 20 pages of eyewitness accounts appended to the chapter.) But from 
the actions of the perpetrators one can infer a few things about the potential cost of 
attempting escape. The Ukrainian victims were primarily rural populations with an 
underdeveloped class of intellectuals who might have articulated the experiences, 
feelings, and thoughts of their compatriots. The famine “corresponded in time with 
a reversal of official policies that had hitherto permitted significant self-expression 
of the USSR’s non-Russian nations.” Now, “non-Russian national self-assertion was 
labeled bourgeois nationalism and suppressed” (p. 157). Freedom of movement was 
eventually curtailed with the introduction of an internal passport system (pp. 166, 
172). Forced collectivization of farms was introduced, using as enforcers city-based 
workers who were notionally integrated into national, pan-Soviet aspirations. 
“Workers were sent from factories, and sometimes a factory would be named 
‘patron’ of a given number of villages; that is, the factory would be assigned villages 
in which to enforce collectivization and seize foods” (pp. 162-163). Accompanied by 
State Political Directorate (GPU) forces and hunting dogs, these “tow brigades” 
would harass, manhandle, torture, and kill peasants in order to search for, find, and 
confiscate food. Horses, tools, and farm implements were removed as well (p. 175). 
With neither passports, transport, or food, and with close supervision of their 
activities, escape was beyond reach. To successfully run away or obtain forged 
papers to travel (p. 171) appear exceptional events. Peasants whose farms had not 
yet been collectivized nonetheless were subject to deliver food quotas. 
Nonfulfillment meant fines and searches of their farms (p. 163). Children were 
encouraged to turn on their parents and report suspected hoarding of food or seeds 
(p. 167). Bits of precious metals and jewelry in peasant possession were extracted in 
exchange for food at an increasing number of state-operated hard currency stores 
(pp. 166, 173). Eyewitness accounts report acts of cannibalism by starving peasants 
to ensure physical survival (e.g., pp. 172/3, 186). Starvation greatly increased 
vulnerability to disease and a great many people died of typhus, dysentery, and the 
like. Demoralization added weight to the psychological cost of dealing with loss of 
lives and property. One eyewitness, then a school child, recalls a Russian-language 
song that in the heyday of starvation “would play every day, ten times a day” over 
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the ubiquitous village loudspeakers heralding the “joyous refrain of town and 
country: Our burdens have lightened, our lives have gladdened” (p. 184). Resistance 
met with virtually immediate reprisal by state security forces (e.g., p. 172). While 
confiscated food stuffs were exported to elsewhere in the USSR, migration was 
prohibited and offers of food aid (imports) were rejected, matching the official denial 
of a food crisis or widespread starvation. As Steven Rosefielde (2009) writes: “Grain 
supplies were sufficient to sustain everyone if properly distributed. People died 
mostly of terror-starvation (excess grain exports, seizure of edibles from the 
starving, state refusal to provide emergency relief, bans on outmigration, and forced 
deportation to food-deficit locales), not poor harvests and routine administrative 
bungling.” All this combined with the vagaries of weather (particularly bad in 
1932/3), with “rapid linguistic and cultural Russification” in Ukrainian cities to 
which many peasants had been transferred under Stalin’s industrialization drive (p. 
167), and topped by state “monopolies or near-monopolies of propaganda, reward, 
and coercion” (p. 167). Starved of resources, figuratively and literally, the cost of 
exit became correspondingly impossible to pay, whatever the victims’ objectives. 
Victimhood might be defined by the degree to which cost and resource constraints 
are binding and foreclose option to escape victimization. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
Much of the literature covers the Holocaust and post-Holocaust cases, and because 
of that this chapter has focused on pre-Holocaust genocides. Given its universal 
claims, if economic theory is relevant post-1940s genocides, it should be relevant 
pre-1940s genocides. Using a six-fold schema elaborated by Anderton (2014) and 
applying it in Section 2 even cursorily to the cases of the Yana, Aborigines, Herero 
and Nama, Armenians, and Ukrainians, we find that all of Anderton’s contentions 
as to the relevance and potential contribution of economics to help understand 
genocide more fully appear correct. A more specific investigation, in Section 3, 
focusing only on genocide as a behavior of choice, likewise reveals that the economic 
concept of meeting objectives (“preferences”) under cost and resource constraints is 
highly relevant and can be illustrated with ease for each of the pre-Holocaust cases 
that this chapter has, however briefly, examined. 
 To conclude, we offer eight impressions from our reading of the cases through an 
economic lens. The first is that the case study writers predominantly seem 
interested in questions of guilt and of justice. Documentation focuses on 
perpetrators’ objectives—however distorted and malevolent—and on the mechanics 
of how and why the atrocities were committed rather than on how and why they 
were carried out in one specific way rather than another. As a whole, the chapters 
rarely directly consider any genocidal act, or escape therefrom, as the outcome of 
constraints imposed by costs and resources. Authors tend to take feasibility as given 
and emphasis is placed on a particular choice made, a behavior observed, and not on 
what the alternatives, if any, were, or on how any one choice came to be made. This 
overstates things for the sake of argument, but an important implication is that one 
cannot hope to improve the score on genocide prevention unless one more fully 
understands the constraints that may divide acts of genocide into feasible and 
infeasible. 
 Second, as to the victims, and again overstating for the sake of argument, in 
most cases the approach taken is about what is done to them and what is not done 
for them: Perpetrators are active, third parties may or may not choose to be active, 
and victims are passive. Even the eyewitness accounts appended to each chapter 
tend to emphasize victims as passive recipients of violence, not exploring the 
options they may or may not have had. To an economist, interesting questions lie in 
exploring what the victims’ cost and resource constraints were and how their 
(presumed) passivity came to be. The Ukrainian peasants who starved to death 
during Stalin’s reign saw their predicament increased as an internal passport 
system and travel restrictions were imposed. This limited their set of feasible 
choices, but limited it to what extent? What were the remaining feasible options? 
Just how did survivors survive? It is not clear to us that genocide survivor stories 
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have been systematically parsed, and compared, to come to a theory-driven and/or 
theory-creating general understanding of why survival occurs, so that survivors’ 
experiences may be used to better assist future victims and limit the damage done. 
 Third, in many of the cases, third parties appear somewhat incidental. In all five 
cases, there was no lack of information about a genocide happening: The German 
settler’s knew and just wanted to changes its course, as did “well-meaning” people 
in Australia. In the Armenian case, the news was widespread throughout the world. 
But the relative capacity or incapacity of potential interveners appears not well 
theoretized or explored and economists might well make helpful contributions in 
this regard. 
 Fourth, regarding preferences, costs, and resources, the cases pay most attention 
to the former, and mostly to those of perpetrators. But one other theme does emerge 
strongly, namely, depriving victims of food sources and compelling them to deal 
with sheer day-to-day physical survival. Herero and Armenians were driven into 
deserts, Ukrainians dispossessed of farm produce, and Yana chased into food-scarce 
mountain regions. While probably beyond the logistical capacity of the world at the 
time, today this suggests that a Convention be sought with built-in triggers 
(thresholds) which, when tripped, precipitate automatic food aid delivery from UN 
depots by UN forces (also see ch. 7 in this volume). 
 Beyond perpetrators, victims, and third parties and beyond preferences, costs, 
and resources, are other observations. From our reading it would appear, fifth, that 
among victims a spontaneous separation takes place. Victims are not all equal; 
some have better opportunities than others. Diasporas seem self-selected, for 
example, in that the relative geographic openness of a genocide-perpetrating 
country matters. When victims can flee with relative ease to neighboring 
countries—some Nama south to the Cape Colony, some Armenians north into 
Russia—then those living near a border will generally have an easier time to escape 
than those bottled up in the country’s interior. Their cost is lower; their opportunity 
set is enlarged, exactly as argued theoretically in Brauer and Anderton (2014). In 
contrast, when one border is more heavily guarded or sealed, then a cross country 
journey to another border becomes all the more hazardous, as illustrated by Herero 
trying to cross the desert. This seems too obvious to state but in the cases we read 
we see little exploration of such themes, nor how they may be exploited to mitigate 
genocide. 
 Sixth, in regard to the productivity with which acts of genocide and mass killings 
are carried out, economies of scale and density are important. For the case of the 
Yana, scale was not as relevant. Living in small bands, being relatively mobile, and 
knowing their own lands better than the pursuers, killing took place one “batch” at 
a time. In contrast, concentrated columns of Armenians marching in the open were 
far easier to attack. Also decisive in facilitating the killing is, seventh, the relative 
speed with which victims and perpetrators can act. Speed depends on transport, 
communication, and bureaucratic or organizational coordination. The set of feasible 
options for victims can become extremely narrow because of timing. For the Yana, 
the genocide wore on for decades and for the Aborigines for about two centuries. The 
economic issue here was neither time nor agglomeration but, to the contrary, the 
dispersed nature of the victims, albeit within well-defined boundaries, combined 
with information and network economies. In the cases of Armenia and Ukraine, the 
killing proceeded fast, in part because perpetrators could coordinate their actions 
far more easily than victims could organize their escape (several chapters in this 
book address aspects of genocide from the point of view of organization). That 
genocide can be both fast and slow should surprise, highlighting once more that 
genocide is conditional, that it stands or falls on its feasibility. 
 Eighth, the economics of image (perceptions) and identity (preferences) is highly 
relevant to genocide and genocide studies (Boulding, 1956; Akerlof and Kranton, 
2011): The relative ease of (self)identification and (self)labeling of victims facilitates 
genocide. The potentially strong call for the development of a supervening identity 
(“we, all of us,” our “common humanity”) is generally not explored in the cases. If 
such calls were made, why were they not heeded? Neither perpetrators, victims, nor 
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third parties are unitary actors. Each of “us” and each of “them” lives by 
constraints, impelling each to action or inaction. What combination of strength of 
conviction (preferences), cost, and resources procures one outcome over another? 
Unless one explores this nexus, one must conclude—probably incorrectly—that for 
the victims there exists no exit. 
 There are other themes in, and tools of, economics that could be helpful to the 
study and prevention of genocide. One thinks for example of (evolutionary) game 
theory and of behavioral economics, both applied elsewhere in this book, such as 
public good coordination failure in game theoretic setups or identifying and 
studying the conditions that shape the anticipatory, strategic behavior of 
perpetrators, victims, and third-parties, or topics such as framing, cognitive bias, 
and reference-point dependence in behavioral economics. Even our brief excursion 
demonstrates that economists can no longer stay away from making the 
contribution their science affords them to make to the study of genocide, mass 
killings, and their prevention. 
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Table A1A (Perpetrators): Comparative genocide study conceptual matrix based on Brauer and Anderton (2014) 
Preferences Prices (costs) Resources 
WHO? [Who held these preferences?] 
1. Architects & rank-and-file (in-group/s) 
2. Whom were they about? (out-group/s) 
3. Are there any in-group opponents with alternate 
preferences? 
WHAT? [What were these preferences about?] 
1. Perceived threat to full political control 
(exclusion of new or persistent rival) 
2. Perceived threat to full territorial control or 
territorial integrity 
3. Perceived desire for ethnic/race purification 
4. Desire for out-group elimination (removal but 
not necessarily death) or extermination (death) 
[either as a means to an end (instrumental 
preferences) or as an end-in-itself (malevolent 
preferences)] 
5. Resource confiscation/looting 
WHY? [Why did these preferences arise?] 
1. Gradual or sudden changes in the internal or 
external sociosphere (political, economic, 
and/or cultural, e.g., entry or exit of third 
party) 
2. Gradual or sudden changes in the biosphere 
WHEN? [When were these preferences formed, 
shifted, or manipulated?] 
1. Ideological antecedents (e.g., race-based 
thinking and eugenics) 
WHERE? [Place/location?] 
1. [...] 
HOW? [How were these preferences formed and 
reinforced?] 
2. Relative ease of identification 
3. Scope; leverage ratio of out/in-groups 




1. Fixed (genocide mgt; plant build-up) 
2. [Any sunk cost?] 
3. Variable (recruitment & training of 
perpetrators; isolation of 
victims; transport; holding 
areas; food, drink, shelter, 
hygiene provision; genocide 
technology; information 
control; security to control 
in/out-groups; border 
patrol/control costs; etc.) 
4. (Im/explicit) permission of theft/looting 
may reduce recruitment cost 
NONMONETARY 
1. Audience cost (e.g., domestic & foreign 
moral disapproval; pressure 
to cease & desist) 
2. Degree of credibility of intervention 
3. Threats (e.g., of persecution/prosecution) 
 
MONETARY 
1. Sheer size of monetary resource pool & 
resource stream (cash-
on-hand plus current 
inflow regime; GDP; 
natural resource stock) 
2. Resource augmentation (higher tax rates 
on incomes & assets; 
forced debt; debt 
repudiation; debt 
rescheduling; forced 
credit & grants; theft 
& looting; depletion of 
natural resources; 








weapons stock; etc.) 





3. Social capital (e.g., sense and strength of 
in-group identity; 
loyalty, probity, 





1. Constrained optimization & trade-offs 
2. Dis/economies-of-scale 
3. Path-dependence & interaction effects with preferences 
4. Complements in production; substitutes in production 
5. Induced substitution by threat of (or actual) intervention 
6. Cost-lowering devices (such as “self-identification” and “self-victimization”) 
7. Learning-by-doing 
8. “Bundling” (e.g., enslavement & death) 




Table A1B (Victims): Comparative genocide study conceptual matrix based on Brauer and Anderton (2014) 
Preferences Prices (costs) Resources 
WHO? [Who held these preferences?] 
10. Of one or more out-groups 
WHAT? [What were these preferences about?] 
1. Avoidance/evasion of identification as out-group 
member & victim 
2. Avoid/evade submission to or abuse by 
perpetrators 
3. Safe escape & wealth transfer/hiding 
4. Physical a/o mental survival of self & family 
5. Self-sacrifice to save others 
6. Preferences usually about the self, not about the 
targeted out-group [median preference] 
WHY? [Why did these preferences arise?] 
1. Basic human preference for security of self, 
family, community exists => fighting for 
appropriate security “market share”? 
[Perpetrators monopolize security by exclusion 
devices?] 
2. Perpetrators arise 
3. Lack of foresight to anticipate the coming danger 
WHEN? [When were these preferences formed, 
shifted, or manipulated?] 
1. Suddenly or gradually? Subtly or obviously? 
WHERE? [Place/location?] 
1. [...] 
HOW? [How were these preferences formed and 
reinforced?] 
1. Nature & role of self-identification 
 
MONETARY 
1. Cost of  resistance (single or collective; 
spontaneous or organized) 
2. Cost of legal passage (e.g., exit visa; 
forfeiture of assets) or cost of 
clandestine passage (e.g., 
distance to safe border 
crossing; bribing guards) 
3. Cost of communication & coordination 
4. Cost placed on running one’s business 
(e.g., restricted occupations, 
place of business, etc.) 
5. Cost of forestalling expropriation 
6. Cost of daily survival (e.g., food, drink, 
clothing, shelter, medications; 
rationing; etc.) 
NONMONETARY 
7. Restrictions placed on schooling, housing, 
occupation, transport, 
movement, association, 
communication, dress, etc. 
8. Nonmonetary costs of passage 
9. Search cost for substitutes 
10. Loss of trust within the out-group 
(declining out-group social 
capital) 
11. Psychological burden of insecurity; 
eventual loss of “spirit” & the 
will to live 
 
MONETARY 
1. Income & assets (threatened by, e.g., 
punitive taxes; limited 
employment; 
underpaid or forced 
labor; forced dissaving; 
asset surrender; 
confiscation, theft, & 
looting) 
NONMONETARY 
1. The institutions of family & community; 
reproductive ability 
2. Real estate and productive hunting or 
grazing land (incl. 
wells, herds, and other 
resources; could be but 
often not thought of as 
monetized) 
3. Special skills & attributes (e.g., links 
overseas; languages 
spoken; youth; current 
location, e.g., close to 
borders) 
4. Relative strength of in-group leadership & 
cohesion that may 
offer protection 
5. ID cards and passports (that may be 
subject to confiscation 
or reissuance) 






7. Avoiding “the singularity of victimhood” 
8. Terrible trade-offs; uncommon choice => high “search cost” for optimal solutions 
9. Humans are vulnerable & slow; hence both attempted destruction and intervention need to 
be substantial & fast [unlike other organisms, the human organism cannot survive long without water & food; foot-travel is slow and distances are often long and arduous] => relative ease of victimization => relative difficulty of effective protection, esp. for impecunious, immobile, incommunicado, young/aged, and/or 
illiterate/unskilled people and more so when the onslaught is rapid & high-scaled 
10. A production function for hiding & escape (a “technology for hiding & escape”)? [Elements 
include ease of victim identification, geography, resistance networks, city/rural settings, closeness of friendly regions, nations, etc.] 
 
Table A1C (Third Parties): Comparative genocide study conceptual matrix based on Brauer and Anderton (2014) 
Preferences Prices (costs) Resources 
WHO? [Who held these preferences?] 
11. Neighboring state/s [NS] (e.g., in their own 
territorial integrity & political stability) 
12. Non-neighboring state/s (e.g., unilateral 
intervener/s) 
13. International organizations [IO] (e.g., UN) 
14. International community [IC] (e.g., NGOs; foreign 
media interests; foreign individuals & businesses) 
WHAT? [What were these preferences about?] 
1. Active opposition to genocide; open or implied 
complicity; outright disagreement 
2. Upholding UN charter and genocide convention; 
state sovereignty principle 
3. Can-do or can-do-nothing attitude 
4. Neutrality or by-stander (“wait-and-see”) 
5. NS and outside interest/s in territorial integrity & 
polity stablity of NS’s 
WHY? [Why did these preferences arise?] 
1. Sovereign control vs universal human rights 
2. Third party political, economic, cultural interests 
for anti-genocide (or silence) preferences 
3. Anti- (or “pro-“)genocide as preference derived from 
(subordinate to) other preferences 
WHEN? [When were these preferences formed, 
shifted, or manipulated?] 
1. Peace of Westphalia; nation-state formation; 
League of Nations; United Nations 
2. Result of pre, during, postcolonial period 
WHERE? [Place/location?] 
1. [...] 
HOW? [How were these preferences formed and 
reinforced?] 
1. Nation-state sovereignty principle 
2. “Responsibility-to-protect” concept 
3. Moral hazard potential 
4. Political, economic, cultural interests 
 
MONETARY 
1. NS: Cost of border patrol/control (dep. on 
physical attributes of borders) 
2. NS: Direct monetary/budgetary cost of 
hosting refugees 
3. Cost of intervention (troops, equipment, 
etc.) 
4. NNS/IO/IC: Distance increases all costs of 
intervention 
5. Information & communication cost 
NONMONETARY 
6. Potential conflict spill-over on NS’s own 
polity 
7. Environmental costs of hosting large 
numbers of refugees 
8. Domestic & global audience cost 
9. Transaction & coordination cost (can be 
monetary) 




11. Specific budgets/funds available for 
equipment, troops, billeting & 
logistics 
12. General size of global GDP 
13. Specific size of intervening country GDP 
NONMONETARY 
14. Audience costs (against perpetrators) [but 
audiences are fickle and can 
change rapidly] 
15. Targeted (“smart”) sanctions, incl. disrupted 
trade & investment, esp. when 
there is an “inclusive elite” (i.e., 
broad-based links to be 
targeted) 
16. Credible threat of penalties against 
perpetrators (e.g., International 
Criminal Court) 
17. Long-term engagement with and 
development of potentially 
vulnerable societies to build up 
a diverse, dispersed resource 
pool; development of 
institutions of law & order; 
land registries; open-society 
culture [possible backlash 
charge of “neocolonialism,” etc.] 




19. Unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral intervention; regional or global multilateral intervention? 
20. Private vs collective interests; amalgamation, bargaining of conflicting interests; UNSC P5 veto 
powers 
21. Coordination, if any, with civil society a/o business parties & interests 
22. Principal-agent & free/easy-rider problem; bargaining over cost-sharing 
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